Protection of Human Rights in Southeast Asia with Special Reference to the Rohingya in Myanmar: A Critical Study of the Effect of ASEAN’s Policy and Action on ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)

Rachminawati,* Dr. Khairil Azmin Mokhtar**

Abstract

Since its inception over four decades ago ASEAN has been working towards improving the lives of its citizens. Year 2009 has opened another chapter with the inauguration of AICHR pursuant to Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter at the 15th ASEAN Summit. Ever since, AICHR has conducted various activities. In the midst of these ‘progress’, the vital question remains unanswered; To what extend AICHR has been successful in protecting human rights of citizens in ASEAN countries? This shall be answered through qualitative legal research. This study serves as an analytical basis to predict the future development of the AICHR as well as human rights protection in South East Asia. Furthermore, it contributes to the reform of both ASEAN and AICHR toward implementation of human rights in the region. This research focuses on human rights issues of the Rohingya in Myanmar whereby ASEAN’s policy and action relating to the issue are examined. The finding shows that the policy and action of ASEAN does not provide much support in protecting the rights of the Rohingya. On the contrary, the policy has hindered the effort of AICHR in protecting human rights. AICHR is considered not independent since it almost completely relies on ASEAN. This article thus suggests ASEAN and its member states to take real and concrete measures to protect human rights. In achieving AICHR and ASEAN’s objectives, ASEAN member states must respect human rights and support AICHR with necessary power and measure.

Keywords: AICHR, ASEAN, Human Rights, Myanmar, Rohingya.

Perlindungan HAM di Asia Tenggara khususnya bagi Rohingya di Myanmar: Studi Kritis terhadap Dampak Kebijakan dan Tindakan Komisi HAM Antarpemerintah ASEAN (AICHR)
A. Introduction

The United Nations (UN) and the United States (US) are of the view that Myanmar government’s actions towards the Rohingya amount to ethnic cleansing. On the same note, EU foreign ministers also condemned the action and describe the situation in Myanmar as "extremely serious" by highlighting the widespread violence conducted by the military which include raping and killing of innocent Rohingyas. In the midst of these condemnations is an important question, what is ASEAN’s policy and action towards the Rohingya’s case? The persecution of ethnic Rohingya is not only a domestic human rights issue, but it is a regional and global problem. The silence and inaction of other ASEAN countries on this issue will not put ASEAN in a good light because the newly inaugurated ASEAN Charter seems to be only a meaningless piece of document. Maybe there is little attention given and no action taken by ASEAN countries on this issue because they rely too much on the regional human rights body, namely the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).

In the light of the circumstances set above, this paper seeks to analyze ASEAN's
policy and action towards Rohingya case and identify what has been done so far by the ASEAN to protect human rights of the victims. In particular, this paper examines AICHR’s policies and action on the human rights violation of Rohingya peoples in Myanmar. The research also identifies hindrances faced by AICHR in protecting the Rohingya. Suggestions on related issues are also offered towards the end of the paper. Accordingly the paper is divided into three main parts which are: first, a brief overview on the Myanmar and Rohingya; second, the ASEAN’s policy and action towards Rohingya case; and third, the ASEAN and the AICHR: hindrances to act on the human rights violation on Rohingya case.

B. Myanmar And The Rohingya Case

Myanmar, also known as Burma, joined as a member of the ASEAN on July 23, 1997. By March 2018, Myanmar's population is about 53 million people. Myanmar is a multi-racial country that includes 135 groups, including the Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine and San. Buddhist is a majority religion. It has become a party to several international human rights treaties such as CEDAW and CRC. Nevertheless, Myanmar has not ratified other main human rights instruments such as ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT and CERD. At the regional level, as member states of ASEAN, Myanmar have signed and ratified the ASEAN Charter which regulates the establishment of the ASEAN human rights body, the AICHR. Furthermore, Myanmar has appointed its representative, H.E. Ambassador Kyaw Tint Swe, to sit in AICHR. In addition, Myanmar is also a signatory to other regional human rights instruments, such as the Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. On the domestic side, the Government of Myanmar through Notification No. 34/2011 has established the National Human Rights Commission of Myanmar. Based on the latest report in 2012, Commission’s activities are focused on the treatment of prisoners and ethnic conflict. In spite of these positive steps, according to observers Myanmar tends to adopt an attitude or policy against the international norm and has a poor record of human rights protection. From 1962 to 2011, Myanmar was led by the military junta, and only in 2010 was held the first election after twenty years. The electoral process is claimed by the military junta to be a transition from military regime to civil democracy. The

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10 Myanmar has ratified The ASEAN Charter on July 21, 2008.
11 Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter.
12 The ASEAN Secretariat, AICHR The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights What You Need To Know, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2012).
success of the transition is put in doubt by allegations of cheating and corruption during the election process.

For decades, Rohingya have faced discrimination and persecution in Buddhist-majority Myanmar. 15 Myanmar has branded Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and systematically dismantled their legal rights and access to basic services in Rakhine, a state where they have lived for generations. 16

More than 5,000 people have been living on a narrow strip of land between the two countries since some 700,000 Rohingya fled the burning of their homes in Myanmar in 2017. 17 There are about 900,000 Rohingya in Bangladesh at the moment, according to UN refugee agency figures, with roughly 212,000 in the country even before the crisis last summer. Some of the camps in southern Bangladesh have existed since the early 90s, meaning anyone under the age of 25 has never lived outside a refugee camp. 18 Being deprived of the basics - including education and adequate nutrition - remains an everyday reality for many Rohingya children, but human trafficking and sexual assault are now posing an extra threat. 19 Myanmar continues to kill its Rohingya, now by denying them health care and sometimes food instead of by wielding machetes and firing bullets. 20

The United Nations has condemned the atrocities, calling them a textbook case of ethnic cleansing. 21 Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto leader of the ruling government, continues to blatantly deny ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in her own country, and she has also rejected the UN inquiry into crimes against Rohingya. In her latest speech in September, she questioned why so many Rohingya Muslims had left when others were living peacefully in the state, pointing to an accusation that Rohingya themselves are “troublemakers.” 22 Although it is very obvious that religious cleansing of the Rohingya is taking place, 23 Aung San Suu Kyi constantly failed to condemn abuses


22 Steve Redisch, “Brownback: Myanmar Conducting ‘Religious Cleansing’ of Rohingya,” VOA News, March 03,
against the Rohingya. Scholars at Yale University and the US Holocaust Museum have already warned that this may be genocide, as has the United Nations human rights chief, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein. This genocide sometimes consists of violent attacks, but now mostly of denying food or medical care. Myanmar has committed violations of numerous international and regional treaties it has ratified or accessed. The atrocities committed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) violate the provisions of numerous sources of international law, creating the perception of Myanmar as a rogue nation.

It is indeed, the fact that the worst human rights violations in Southeast Asia today are taking place in Myanmar. Myanmar continues to emphasise that the Rohingya issue is an internal affair, and seems to prefer dealing directly with interlocutors in a bilateral setting. Myanmar mostly bans foreigners from Rohingya areas. Myanmar rejected to work with the UN, and the ASEAN seems to be the only platform where Myanmar feels comfortable enough to share and discuss the case.

C. The Asean’s Policy And Action Towards The Rohingya Case

It is really unfortunate that the AICHR is very silent on the issue of human rights violation in Myanmar. Among leaders of ASEAN member states, only Malaysia’s former prime minister, Najib Razak, has condemned the violence in Myanmar. He described the military operations as “genocide”. In Indonesia, despite pressure from rights groups and Muslim groups in the country, the government stopped short of condemning Myanmar, but offered humanitarian aid to Rohingya refugees. Singapore commits to help humanitarian effort through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) center. There was an agreement between the government of Indonesia and Laos to cooperate to solve the humanitarian problem in Myanmar. Brunei also offers humanitarian assistance to Myanmar by sending more Brunei NGO’s to Rohingya refugee camp. Cambodia remains with its stand not to internationalize the case as they perceive the issue as an internal affair of the Myanmar’s government.


Nicholas Kristof, “I Saw a Genocide in Slow Motion”, Loc. cit.


Ibid.


government donates quite a lot to support the live of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. However, the government refuses to recognize Rohingyas as refugees.  

Vietnamese President lends supports to Bangladesh in finding an effective and lasting solution to Rohingya crisis but doesn’t care about Rohingya or what happen in Myanmar.  

Philippine, which is chairing the AICHR, has shown lack of concern to Rohingya case.  

The responses cited above are by individual member states. Most of them tend to avoid to have formal and official collective as an institution? It is hard to find explicit policy or statement coming from ASEAN as well the the AICHR. In the ASEAN’s website, they upload “Speeches & Statements” of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the Former Secretary-General of ASEAN, and other leaders. It assumes that their response on the case will be explicitly stated there. Unfortunately, few of their speech had talked on the case of Myanmar (Rohingya). The latest speech was Remarks by H.E. Dato Lim Jock Hoi Secretary-General of ASEAN (2018 – 2022) in the Handover Ceremony for the Transfer of Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN Jakarta on 5 January 2018 did not even mention one word about Myanmar or Rohingya.  

The study also refers to research conducted and published by The Forum Asia. Unfortunately, there was no significance findings on the involvement of the AICHR from 2009/2010 (when it was established) until 2016.  

In 2009/ 2010, the AICHR did not do anything on the increasing and

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systemic human rights violation in Burma where thousands of people are held in prison for exercising their political rights. The Burmese activist said that they submitted cases of human rights violation in Burma and heard nothing from the ASEAN’s body. Many statements of The ASEAN about them being “people oriented” are contradictory with the action of some ASEAN governments. The AICHR’s poor performance reflects most ASEAN’s governments lack of commitment on human rights, although they already have a common regional human rights body.

In 2011 when Indonesia was the chairman of the AICHR, the report concluded that Indonesia is generally regarded as one of the countries pushing most strongly for the advancement of human rights in ASEAN. Unfortunately, however, ASEAN, as the main institution consistently adopted and used the “ASEAN way” to veto the policy of the AICHR. Working under severe political constraints at that time, the AICHR did not publish a single document during the year. As a result of the pressure there was no discussion on Rohingya case although one of contributors to the report was Arakan Rohingya Refugee Committee (ARRC).

Until to 2012, the AICHR remained silent on the case of ethnic minority in Kachin and Arakan States in Myanmar. This was due to no support from ASEAN. The AICHR needs the ASEAN to improve the mandate on the protection of human rights, so that the AICHR can address the case. The AICHR will lose its credibility if fails to address such gross human rights violation as what is happening in Myanmar. If this case was resolved at that time, maybe the problems of Rohingya would not be as massive as today. The year 2013 remain quite on the issue of Rohingya. In 2014 the AICHR was inaugurated its 5 years of working. The report found that the AICHR continued to be focused exclusively on the promotion of human rights, while protection continued to be elusive. The AICHR’s member commissions never come to agree to submit the proposal on the TOR revision to the AMM. This was one of factors which made the AICHR powerless and voiceless on critical human rights violation in the region including on Rohingya case. Similarly in 2015, the AICHR continued to focus on promotional human rights activities in the form of debate, workshop, training, and dialogue. The AICHR remained inactive on some key human rights issues in the region.
such as cases of enforced disappearances in ASEAN.\textsuperscript{51}

The ASEAN finally responded to the situation in the Rakhine State on 24 September 2017, a month after all act of violence in Rakhine State that lead the exodus of Rohingya peoples to the Bangladesh. The ASEAN issued the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Humanitarian Situation in Rakhine State. The Foreign Ministers of ASEAN expressed concern over the recent developments in Northern Rakhine State of Myanmar and extended their deepest condolences to all the victims and affected communities of the conflict. They condemned the attacks against Myanmar security forces on 25 August 2017 and all acts of violence which resulted in loss of civilian lives, destruction of homes and displacement of large numbers of people.\textsuperscript{52} The exodus began on 25 August 2017 after Rohingya militants attacked police posts, killing 12 members of the security forces. Those attacks led to a security crackdown. Myanmar’s military says it is fighting insurgents but those who have fled say troops and Rakhine Buddhists are conducting a brutal campaign to drive them out.\textsuperscript{53} Reading from the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Humanitarian Situation in Rakhine State, The ASEAN stands in favor of the Myanmar government. This was unfair, since there was no investigation conducted by the ASEAN’s institution before they issue the statement. Malaysia disagreed with and was detaching itself from a separate statement. The Malaysian government was angry because the ASEAN statement made no mention of the word “Rohingya,” members of a stateless Muslim minority group who allegedly have been targeted in atrocities in Myanmar’s Rakhine state.\textsuperscript{54}

The Foreign Ministers of ASEAN acknowledged that the situation in Rakhine State is a complex inter-communal issue with deep historical roots. They strongly urged all the parties involved to avoid actions that will further worsen the situation on the ground. They are agreed that viable and long-term solutions to the root causes of the conflict must be found, including encouraging closer dialogue between Myanmar and Bangladesh, so that the affected communities can rebuild their lives. The Foreign Ministers welcomed the commitment by the Myanmar authorities to ensure the safety of civilians, take immediate steps to end the violence in Rakhine, restore normal socio-economic conditions, and address the refugee problem through verification process. Unfortunately, there is no monitoring mechanism to observe how far the commitment has been implemented by the Myanmar authorities.

Having said nothing about Rohingya in the statement made by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, clearly shows that human rights under the respectful institution of the ASEAN is a travesty. This is a real ignorance of Rohingya peoples, which in fact they are all ASEAN’s citizens regardless of Myanmar’s recognition on their citizenship. Ironically, instead of urging for immediate action to settle the dispute, the ASEAN insist that all ASEAN member states to remain passive.

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\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
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D. THE ASEAN AND THE AICHR: HINDRANCES TO ACT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION ON THE ROHINGYA CASE

The AICHR has been criticized for not responding to some human rights cases in South East Asia including on Rohingya crisis. Assessment of the AICHR’s creation, design, and its works may shed some lights on the matter.

1. Analysis of AICHR’s Formation, Objective and Principles

Establishing regional human rights mechanisms under the ASEAN was not seriously considered until the end of the Cold War until the five founding fathers of the ASEAN declare the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord (1976). The declaration’s principle, emphasized more on the anticolonialism human rights approach rather the viewpoints of individual rights. This is different compared to the West. For instance the establishment of human rights in the European region mainly is to promote and protect individual rights since the beginning. Following the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord, in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976 (TAC), the fundamental principles of ASEAN include nothing about rights of individuals but “the right of every State to lead its national existence”, bearing in mind their recent national independence and the fear of communist invasion/subversion. The leader of ASEAN put the principle of sovereignty and non-interference as their main principles that govern their relations towards any situation and issue including human rights. These principles have prevented them from enacting policies and making statements to protect the human rights of members that may be seen as interfering in the domestic problems of another ASEAN member. The ASEAN’s leader tend to avoid discussions on human rights at time of its formation.

It was not until 1991 that the term “human rights” appeared in the Joint Communique of the ASEAN foreign ministers. In the Joint Communique it is stated that the foreign ministers exchanged ideas on human rights issues in their relations between States. Although human rights are universal, the diversity of cultural, economic and social of individual States cause the implementation to the competencies and responsibilities of each State, and consequently the nature human rights in the states are diverse. the Joint Communique also affirmed that the implementation of human rights should not be contrary to the principle of state sovereignty. The crux of the problem having a universal value and common implementation of human rights in ASEAN countries is not just the state of rights, but the fact that the very concept of human rights remains foreign to most states in the region. Most Southeast Asian governments continue to perceive security as being


56 It has been initiated in 1949 by the six founding fathers, who are also the founding fathers of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. They are Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany; Robert Schuman, French Republic Minister for Foreign Affairs; Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium in the 40s and 50s; Alcide de Gasperi, Prime Minister of the Republic of Italy; Ernest Bevin, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

limited to preserving the regime rather than securing their people.\(^{61}\) This is a very serious problem and limits the work of the ASEAN human rights body. Many experts and activist push the ASEAN and its member states to adhere to the international human rights law and practice, which is contrary to what most of its members intent.

The main challenge is perhaps how to make ASEAN own human rights standard and mechanism. A question related to this perhaps is whether the AICHR represent the intention and value of ASEAN or the will a third party? The first attempt to build the regional human rights mechanism was actually in 1993, shortly after the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, where the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) finally agreed on the need to establish a regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN.\(^{62}\) Following the agreement on the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism in 1994, in 1998 the ASEAN created an informal non-governmental working groups in the realization of the ASEAN human rights mechanism.\(^{63}\) In 2000, The AMM agreed on concrete steps to establish a regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN, and furthermore agreed on the need of establishment of a national human rights mechanism in several ASEAN countries.\(^{64}\) There was various response from ASEAN countries; some are positive and others tend to be resistant with the idea.\(^{65}\) There was a very slow progress until they agreed to have an article specifically mandated the ASEAN to create Human Rights Body (Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter) until the ASEAN member states agreed to establish the AICHR in 2009. The decision to build the AICHR in 2009, return backward to the first formal inception of human rights in the ASEAN reform policy in 2004, according to Davies was not merely the decision of ASEAN’s leaders. He found out that there was Track III actor, the Working Group for the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (the Working Group) who persuasively assure member states to talk and at the end to establish human rights body, which was successfully achieved.\(^{66}\) The expert in the Working Group stated that was visualized the body as a realistic, credible, and effective mechanism in setting up a regional human rights body in the ASEAN region.\(^{67}\) How about the visualization of the ASEAN’s head of states at that time? If their visualization similar to what have been visualized by the expert, the AICHR will actively response to Rohingya case. The situation will be huge different. In fact, there is no sincere motive on political agenda in ASEAN to human rights.\(^{68}\) Thus the current body is not realistic, credible, and effective in protecting human rights of the people in the region.

Above analysis and explanations on the process of the AICHR’s establishment shows how shaky the body is. Overall it gives some idea why the AICHR has not done anything significant in Rohingya case. The principle of sovereignty and non-interference had much influence in the designing of the AICHR, and this could be identified as the main hindrance in the work of the IACHR on Rohingya case.


\(^{63}\) Ibid, p. 7.

\(^{64}\) Ibid, p. 179 and 185; Also see Abubakar Eby Hara, “The Concerns and Sustainability of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR),” p. 50.


2. Analysis of AICHR’s Institutional Structure and Power

For ASEAN, the establishment of AICHR is regarded as a remarkable achievement of regional human rights mechanisms. However, the AICHR is entrusted with very little power compared to the regional mechanisms of America, Europe, and Africa. While other regional mechanisms were formed based on a treaty, the AICHR was only formed based on a TOR, a non-legally binding instrument. This section assesses the TOR, identifying the drawbacks and at the same time looking for a solution within the system itself. This step is important to be done before moving forward to find an external solution which Member states usually are resistant to it. The assessment of the TOR will start from the most criticized provisions which are AICHR’s mandate, followed by other provisions which affect the works of AICHR on the human rights protection in the region.

Weak Mandate of AICHR

The AICHR’s mandate and function are modest in the extreme. It is limited only to the monitoring of human rights rather than protection or enforcement. This leaves the questions: Can the AICHR reach the aim as its stated in the TOR with this very limited mandate? The word ‘toothless’ has often brought up due to the limitation of the mandates that the AICHR has. There is no clear mandate about human rights protection as the AICHR is not entrusted with a power to give sanction or punishment to human rights violators. In addition, no country visit and individual complaint.

Does this weak mandate the main problem of the AICHR in responding to many human rights violations? Yes, it does, under present circumstances, the AICHR will not make a meaningful contribution towards the tangible protection of human rights of its citizens. The TOR ideally establish an independent human rights body with both promotion and protection function which will have a role in monitoring the implementation of international human rights obligation arising from UDHR and many international human rights treaties where ASEAN member states are parties.

The former ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, stated that the AICHR is still in its formative years, and therefore it was not there yet to have an independent and strong mandate on protection. According to him, the establishment of the AICHR was the ASEAN’s successful achievement, now human rights become an official dialogue in the region without fundamentally challenging ASEAN norms. This has to be understood by many outsiders who always devalue the existence of the AICHR. Is was inappropriate to say that the AICHR doesn’t look like going to mean anything. The AICHR needs time to change. On other

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75 Poole, Avery. “‘The World is Outraged’: Legitimacy in the Making of the ASEAN Human Rights Body”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2015, p. 372. Ibid., p. 373.
positive note, the “ASEAN way” is believed to build stable relations amongst ASEAN members.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite all drawbacks of the AICHR’s TOR, there is an opportunity for the AICHR to use some provisions in the TOR to do protection mandate. The first mandate of AICHR (which is to develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to complement the building of the ASEAN Community)\textsuperscript{78} added with the other mandate (which is to obtain information from the ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection of human rights),\textsuperscript{79} can be used by the AICHR to accept individual complaints and to do investigations on human rights violations or at least to request information as follow ups to complaints. Basically, the TOR which consists of provisions may be skeletal, but legally there are no provisions can stop AICHR to do the protection mandate.\textsuperscript{80} This kind of wide interpretation can only work if the AICHR’s representative is independent, however, it is not that easy to find such kind of commissioner. There was a big hope when Rafendi Djamin chair the AICHR, in late March 2010, during the AICHR’s first formal session in Jakarta, he was misfortune to have to be the ‘public face’ of that Commission as it rejected a request to investigate a complaint by families of journalists massacred in Maguindanao, Philippines, in November 2009.\textsuperscript{81} If at that time he accepted this complaint, most probably AICHR’s journey will not such slow as today.

\textbf{Non-Independence of the Commission}

Apart from the issue of mandate, another shortfall of the AICHR is the status of the member of the Commission. There is an issue of independence. In addition, this body is not impartial because the TOR of AICHR specifically mentions that the AICHR only serves as a consultative body to the governments of ASEAN countries.\textsuperscript{82} Although in another point, it mentions that the AICHR’s members to be determined as an independent, however in practice they are generally not independent from their government’s interests.\textsuperscript{83} ASEAN as an institution has to make the human rights body has its own independence. One element relates to staffing the institution. Since the staff is under a reward system, having to do with the support of the home state, an international official often feels compelled to maintain ties with his or her home state, giving rise to the problem of multiple or divided loyalties.\textsuperscript{84}

According to several reports on the Performance of the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism by Forum Asia from 2009 to 2016 that the problems also lies in the appointment process of the commission.\textsuperscript{85} In 2009, only two member states, Indonesia and Thailand used an open and transparent procedure to appoint their representative. Others are done behind the closed door and the appointees are without many

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{78} 4.1 TOR of the AICHR.
\textsuperscript{79} 4.10 TOR of the AICHR.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{ibid.}, p. 517.
\textsuperscript{82} According to the TOR of the AICHR, Membership of The AICHR shall consist of the Member States of ASEAN; and Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Representative to the AICHR who shall be accountable to the appointing Government.
\textsuperscript{84} Chen, Lung-chu, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 70
\textsuperscript{85} Supra, n. 40.
\end{flushright}
competencies in Human Rights works. There is no progress regarding this issue until 2019, where only Indonesia consistent to use open selection by appointing Yuyun Wahyuningrum, a successor of Dinna Wisnu and Rafendi Djamin. Furthermore, the AICHR meetings are shrouded in secrecy. The agenda, minutes, and outcome are closed. Scant information released to the public. This is a very serious problem. In order to be accountable, the AICHR cannot keep working in secrecy. During the research, gaining the data from the official channel was difficult to work.

Lack of Financial Support
Financial is also a matter for AICHR. The AICHR has a limited budget, no secretariat, no permanent office, and no paid employees. In addition, the lack of financial support from the ASEAN to the AICHR indicate that the ASEAN lack of intention to empower the body as well as to support human rights implementation in the region. It envisages by those shaky foundations the AICHR could be no more as a human rights outlet manager. There are strong needs to change the constituent instrument of the AICHR, the TOR, to be able to work as a real human rights body that can protect its peoples’ rights.

Weak Relationship with Other Human Rights Bodies within ASEAN
There is actually another strong basis for AICHR as well as ASEAN as an institution to go for enforcement human rights mechanism. This is explicitly stated in the TOR that the AICHR is the overarching human rights institution for the ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Women and Children and the ASEAN Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers. The AICHR has overall responsibility for the promotion and protection of the human rights. Hence, supposedly the AICHR can work beyond the promotional function especially for certain issues of Women, Children and Migrant worker. Moreover, for the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), the first substantive treaty in ASEAN, The AICHR has more opportunity to go for protection mandate. It will also test the relation of ASEAN with other non-ASEAN institution especially the UN who deal with this issue as the ACTIP provisions parallel the multilateral UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol against human trafficking (The Palermo Protocol). AICHR and these bodies have to build stronger relationship and work together to find out some way to give more human rights protection.

There are two main ASEAN bodies in which the AICHR have to work closely, the Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat. The Secretary-General of ASEAN may bring relevant issues to the attention of the AICHR in accordance with Article 11.2 (a) and (b) of the ASEAN Charter. In so doing, the Secretary-General of ASEAN shall concurrently inform the ASEAN Foreign Ministers of these issues. However, this hardly found in practice. In contrary, the AICHR have to bring human rights issues to the attention of the Secretary-General or other ASEAN main bodies and forum. In addition, The ASEAN Secretariat shall provide the necessary

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87 Ibíd, p. 141.
89 Ibid, p. 18.
91 6.8 TOR of the AICHR.
93 7 TOR of the AICHR.
94 7.1 TOR of the AICHR.
secretarial support to the AICHR to ensure its effective performance. To facilitate the Secretariat’s support to the AICHR, ASEAN Member States may, with the concurrence of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, send their officials to the ASEAN Secretariat.\textsuperscript{95}

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat staff have “exclusively ASEAN character” responsibilities. The further question is what does it mean by “exclusively ASEAN character”? in executing their task, both have to be apolitical and professional, and always uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency, and competence.\textsuperscript{96} In practice, these must be defined thoroughly and to perhaps some extent with a wide interpretation this could be a way for ASEAN as an institution to directly involve and show power in developing human rights regime in the region. In addition to that, member states are required to respect their independence and not "seek to influence them" in the discharge of their responsibilities.\textsuperscript{97}

There are also many channels that could bring human rights issues at the level of ASEAN to level up the efficacy of human rights in the region such as at ASEAN Summit. However, as there are problems from the legality of ASEAN Summit decision which make this summit seems meaningless to advance human rights in the region, among others are the problem of incorporation (Lack of Direct Effect), the problem of hybridity and normative transplantation, the problem of diffuse or insufficient judicial oversight.\textsuperscript{98} Brining human rights issue at the summit are not the AICHR's responsibility due to their very limited power, however, other bodies such as Secretary General have more capacity on it.

In sum, The AICHR shall work with all ASEAN sectorial bodies dealing with human rights to expeditiously determine the modalities for their ultimate alignment with the AICHR. To this end, the AICHR shall closely consult, coordinate and collaborate with such bodies in order to promote synergy and coherence in ASEAN’s promotion and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{Lack of Commitment of ASEAN Main Institution to integrate Human Rights into Their Law and Policy}

ASEAN focused more on its energies on economic growth and security.\textsuperscript{100} It is well-known that ASEAN put security as the topmost priority, so ideally, human rights are under the pillar of Security Community or perhaps has its own pillar. Unfortunately, human rights have both under Security Community Pillar by only stated ASEAN’s commitment for promotion and protection of human rights in the region and under Socio-Cultural Community for certain human rights in particularly vulnerable groups of rights. It has no clarity at all, and no wonder if human rights are likely to be further diminished in the region. Most regrettably, there is no reference to human rights in the Economic Community Pillar.\textsuperscript{101} ASEAN should learn from the EU on how they integrate human rights into their economic union meaning that human rights and economic are related and can not dismiss each other. ASEAN both as an

\begin{itemize}
  \item 7.2 TOR of the AICHR.
  \item Ibid.
  \item 6.9 TOR of the AICHR.
\end{itemize}
institution and member states have also to focus not only on economic integration but also human rights. 102

Not much can be expected from the AICHR if it is built on shaky foundations and created as a ‘toothless tiger’. Nevertheless, we should not be pessimistic, but at the same time, we need to be realistic. As commonly acknowledged, a full-fledged regional human rights regime is usually composed of three pillars: firstly, an overarching regional human rights convention, secondly, a human rights commission responsible for investigating and monitoring functions, and thirdly, a regional human rights court to protect individuals and to ensure enforcement of human rights laws. 103 It was proven in European, American, and African regions, 104 and it is something that the ASEAN should learn and adapt. 105 Further discussion on these regions will be in the next chapter.

If an absent and inaction culture maintains, the ASEAN just provide an unsatisfactory and very much artificial with its human rights mechanisms. To the worst, keeping these culture, ASEAN can be said to be a human rights violator. This may be too far or too wild assumption on the ASEAN. However, if it is happened, based on international law, ASEAN has a Responsibility as an International Organization as it is recognized in article 61.1 of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of International Organization (ARIO) 2011 who can be charged to the institution in such situation. 106 In addition, when an international body is absent or inaction in responding to gross human rights violations, the proponents may claim to do unilateral sanctions or even use of force in the form of humanitarian intervention. 107 This situation could happen in the near future in ASEAN, and to that, the organization must provide the rule of the game to avoid chaos.

E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Two main key findings are presented in this paper. Firstly, in relation to ASEAN’s policy and action towards Rohingya case. Secondly, on the hindrances of the AICHR to act on the human Rights violation on Rohingya Case. It is hard to find explicit and strong policy or statement of the ASEAN as well the the AICHR on this case of Myanmar since all the discussion behind the closed door. Each ASEAN member states respond


104 There is strong and clear background of the European under the auspices The Council of Europe (the CoE) was established in the aftermath of the second world war, has numbers of countries join forces to set up the Council of Europe to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law across Europe. There was strong will from the states’ leaders to avoid any war in the future such those which had ravaged Europe in 1939-45 and earlier in 1914-18. There was a very important meeting in The Hague on 8-10 May that lead the establishment this organization. A year later, the statute of Europe was signed on 5 May 1949 at St. James’s Palace, London by ten founding members which were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.


106 http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_11_2011.pdf “A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject matter of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the state, would have constituted a breach of the obligation.”

differently and individually, but most of them tend to avoid to have standing on the issue, they only involve on the humanitarian aspects of the case. There was almost no policy on Rohingya case in favor of the victims. No policy on the investigation of the case. The absence of policy on this case shows that the respectful institution of the ASEAN is a travesty. Both the existence of the ASEAN and the AICHR seems so useless in Rohingya case. Considering the nature of the AICHR, the ASEAN as the main institution have to support the AICHR by giving a clear policy and standing on this issue. The ASEAN elites may hold the ASEAN way by respecting Myanmar to settle their domestic dispute, however, they also have to create a mechanism to visit, to monitor and to give suggestion to end the conflict and protect the victims. It is also found that there are several hindrances have been identified for the inaction of the AICHR, particularly in Rohingya case. The hindrances affect the responses of AICHR in other cases of human rights in the region. First, the principle of sovereignty and non-interference that had much influence in the designing of the AICHR. Secondly, the hindrances from the institutional aspect of the AICHR are including: the weak mandate of the AICHR, limited only to monitoring function; the member of the Commission is not independent since it serves as a consultative body to the governments of ASEAN countries; the AICHR’s meeting shrouded in secrecy, the lack of financial support from the ASEAN to the AICHR, and the use of the old fashioned ASEAN way by the ASEAN leader to settle the Dispute.

In order to remove all hindrances above, the ASEAN need to review the TOR and make some improvements on the main reform issues which are the mandate, the independency of the commission, the budget and other technical support for the AICHR. The ASEAN also need to prepare seriously the future of the AICHR which are stronger than the current system. On top of that, the ASEAN leader need to seek and set their “new ASEAN Way” according to their new commitment stipulating in the ASEAN Charter and any other ASEAN legal instruments. While preparing a long-term reform of the AICHR, The ASEAN and its member states should take real and concrete effort to protect human rights of Rohingya people which are spreading in some ASEAN member states and Bangladesh. They have to plan the future life of Rohingya people, because they are also citizens of ASEAN community.

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