The Erosion of Judicial Independence in the Revision of the Constitutional Court Law and Its Impact on the Legitimacy of Decisions

Abstract

This study analyzes the erosion of the Constitutional Court's (MK) judicial independence resulting from the revision of Law No. 24 of 2003 by Law No. 7 of 2020, focusing on the altered judicial selection mechanisms by the DPR and the President, the maximum age limit of 70 years, and the single-term tenure. Utilizing a normative legal research approach with statutory and conceptual methods via literature review, this study examines the position of the Constitutional Court as the Guardian of the Constitution, the impact of the revision on judicial uncertainty, and the potential decline in the legitimacy of its rulings. The results indicate that legislative and executive dominance has created judicial capture, diminished public trust, and challenged the supremacy of the 1945 Constitution as mandated by Article 24 paragraph (1). This revision triggers constitutional disharmony, the erosion of the Court's authority, and judicial uncertainty. The conclusion emphasizes the necessity of pure meritocracy in judicial selection and the strengthening of checks and balances. Recommendations include executive and legislative self-restraint, transparent legislative oversight, further amendments to the Constitutional Court Law, and subsequent empirical research on restoring constitutional legitimacy.